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DEFORESTATION AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION: 
LESSONS FROM THE UPPER KERINCI REGION, INDONESIA 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study outlines a case where the behaviour of farmers in accumulating capital, rather than 
their poverty as commonly assumed, results in deforestation. Fieldwork was undertaken in the 
Upper Kerinci region of the island of Sumatera, Indonesia. A financial analysis of the "net 
income" streams received by farmers from deforestation is performed. Because forest lands can 
be "captured" and privatised through clearing, forest clearing and the subsequent agriculture have 
the capacity to produce high financial returns for farmers as well as to provide adequate capital 
to finance the next forest clearing. Such a capacity enables landless farmers to become land 
owners. Forest clearing also enables farmers to own a "long-term maturity bond" in the form of a 
cinnamon plantation. Poverty precludes poorer farmers from deforestation, and decisions to clear 
a forest rest mostly with more established farmers.  Financial surpluses from outside the forestry 
and agricultural sectors are also used to finance forest clearing.   
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 DEFORESTATION AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION: 
 LESSONS FROM THE UPPER KERINCI  
REGION, INDONESIA 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Tropical forests are being deforested at a disturbing rate. According to most recent estimates of 
the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), deforestation occurred at a rate of 15.4 million 
hectares year-1, or about 1.2% year-1 between 1981-1990 (1). Worse still, forest extinction by 
early next century appears to be not unlikely for countries like the Ivory Coast, Paraguay, and 
Nepal where forests disappear by 5.9, 4.6 and 3.9% year-1, respectively (2). Whilst many 
recognise that deforestation has multiple causes (3-5), and some causes or mix of causes are 
regional specific (6), a significant portion of deforestation may be associated with the action of 
farmers. In Indonesia, for example, smallholders are said to be responsible for 55% of the 
nation's deforestation rate (7).  
 
It is often assumed that farmers clear a forest because of their poverty. While such an argument 
may be valid for certain cases, e.g. in the case of shifting cultivation and fuelwood collection in 
Zaire (8), our report shows that deforestation can depend on the capital accumulation behaviour 
of richer farmers and holders of capital. Poverty is usually a deterrent to deforestation because 
the poorest farmers have inadequate capital to finance forest clearing and other associated costs. 
 
 
METHODS 
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The study was conducted in the subdistrict of Gunung Kerinci (Mount Kerinci) in the Upper 
Region of the Kerinci-Seblat National Park (KSNP) in 1995. The park is located on the island of 
Sumatera, Indonesia. Of the subdistrict's 66 villages, three were selected because they have 
severer deforestation problem than do the other villages (9). The villages are located in the 
mountainous range of Mount Kerinci, i.e. on the Kayu Aro plateau, with an altitude varying from 
1200 to 1500 metres above sea level.  
 
Primary data were collected from interviews with a randomly-selected sample of 55 farmers. The 
questionnaire includes questions about household characteristics, history of forest clearing and 
land ownership, ownership of other agricultural capital, farm production and consumption 
expenditure. Price and trading volume data were collected from farmers' transaction records kept 
by a major village trader who also happens to be the head of one of the villages surveyed. The 
records contain information on actual selling price received by each farmer, number of delivery 
times, the quantity of output sold per delivery, purchase of farm inputs and the amount of each 
farmer's outstanding loan for the period of October 1994-July 1995. Yield of the main tree crop 
in the KSNP region, i.e. cinnamon, was estimated by actual measurement of yield obtained from 
cinnamon trees of 4, 5, 6, 8, 12 and 15 years of age. Estimates for each age group were obtained 
by taking 2-5 samples of trees. Throughout the field work, a series of observations on ladangs 
(dry-land farming) at the forest frontier were undertaken. These ladangs are located about 1800 
to 2000 metres above sea level and can only be reached by walking for about 3-4 hours from the 
villages.  
The main tenet of the report is that deforestation occurs because it is financially beneficial for 
farmers to clear a forest (10). Thus, emphasis will be given to the financial analysis of "net 
income" streams received by farmers from conversion of forest land into a ladang. The term "net 
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income" refers to the surplus or deficit after investment and operational costs are deducted from 
revenues. In the financial analysis, no wages are paid to family labour employed in the farm, 
while the financial cost of land is equal to the total costs of converting a forest land into a 
ladang. For comparative purposes, a simple economic analysis is undertaken. In this case, the 
shadow price of family labourers is set equal to the prevailing market wages, while that of land 
to the actual market price of a ladang. The Net Present Value (NPV) at a social discount rate of 
16% (11) and the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) are computed. The NPV refers to the value today 
of future net income when discounted at a given discount rate, while the IRR is the discount rate 
that equates the NPV to zero. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Ladangs and Farmers at the Forest Frontier 
 
The most common farming system found in ladangs is multicropping involving cinnamon 
(Cinnamomum burmanni) and annual crops. Cinnamon represents a long-term investment for the 
farmers while annual crops provide the short term, regular production. Cinnamon trees are 
generally planted in rows about 4 metres apart, and spaced about 1-2 metres apart along each 
row. Potato is the most popular type of annual crop planted, with a relatively small amount of 
scallion and maize.  This system of multicropping is practiced until cinnamon trees reach an age 
of about 6 years. Afterwards, the system will become a monoculture of cinnamon, with a 
negligible amount of annual crops or bananas grown on the edge. 
 
On the basis of their relation to a ladang, farmers can be grouped into: (a) anak ladang (tenants), 
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(b) anak ladang/land owner, (c) land owner, and (d) induk semang (land owner and capital 
provider). Anak ladangs are operators of a ladang. They are usually landless, young (i.e. below 
30 years of age) and have limited household capital. With the exception of a few unsuccessful 
farmers, after several years working as an anak ladang, older farmers are usually capable of 
accumulating adequate capital to own a ladang, by way of purchasing an existing ladang and/or 
clearing a nearby forest. In this case the farmers become land owners. They may opt to operate 
all of the ladang(s) if they have adequate family labour, or to let new anak ladangs operate some 
of the ladang(s). In the latter case, the farmers become anak ladangs and land owners at the same 
time. Alternatively, they may opt to let new anak ladangs operate all of the ladang(s), thus 
becoming purely land owners. Induk semangs are on the highest rung of the ladder. They are 
usually land owners and cash capital providers who often hold a respected position in the village, 
e.g. as head of the village. 
 
Establishment of a Ladang and Property Right Arrangement 
 
According to the Indonesian constitution, forests within the Indonesian jurisdiction belong to the 
state.  In practice, however, traditional tribes consider forests as free, communal assets. Those 
who clear a forest are entitled to claim ownership to the cleared land. 
 
In the villages surveyed, after clearing a forest the owner usually leaves the land idle for about 1 
to 12 months to let the fallen trees dry out. During this "drying period" regrowth of Imperata 
cylindrica or "alang-alang" occurs and covers the land.  The length of the drying period, 
however, depends not only on rainfall intensity but also on the availability of potential anak 
ladangs. This is because the owner is often not endowed with sufficient family labour to 
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cultivate all the land. Thus, the land is not utilised until an anak ladang asks for a contract to 
sharecrop the land. 
 
Depending on the owner's judgment, the sharecropping contract can be set for a period of as 
short as one year to about 12-15 years. The contracts usually take on the following forms: 
a. The 1:1 system. This is the most popular system in the villages surveyed. The system 
entitles anak ladangs to keep the income from their annual crops. The owner is to 
provide cinnamon seedlings, but not a living allowance nor cash for the purchase of farm 
inputs. Income from cinnamon is divided equally. If however anak ladangs have 
inadequate cash to support themselves and/or to bear the costs of potato farming, they 
can borrow cash from an induk semang. Normally no interest payment is imposed on the 
borrowing, but anak ladangs are obliged to sell their potatoes to the induk semang. Loan 
repayment is directly deducted from the value of output upon delivery.  
b. The 1:2 system. Under this system, in the first three years of the contract the owner 
supplies anak ladangs with about 50 kgs rice month-1, or about 200 kgs per planting 
season. Income from annual crops is divided equally, while that from cinnamon is 
distributed as follows: one-third for anak ladang and two-third for the owner. The system 
is rarely adopted because it is financially less attractive for anak ladang. The average 
size of ladang operated is about 0.2 hectare, with an average yield of 1867 kgs. Given 
that potato prices are usually comparable to or higher than those of rice, it is very 
uneconomical to trade off half of potato production (i.e. 933.5 kgs) and one-sixth of 
cinnamon output for 200 kgs of rice (13).  
 
After a contract is agreed by both parties, the land is cleared of regrowth. Land owners usually 
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hire anak ladang(s) to do this job. Once land clearing is completed, anak ladangs may start 
cultivating the land. They are free to plant any annual crops, but potato is the most popular one 
because of its agro-climatic suitability, attractive price and relatively high yields. Anak ladangs 
are also obliged to grow cinnamon during the period of the contract. 
 
For the first 6 years of the contract, anak ladangs rely mostly on income from annual crops to 
support themselves. Between year 4 and 6 about half of the total number of cinnamon trees are 
cut down to thin the crop. This practice provides additional income for anak ladang. Some anak 
ladangs may also earn income from wet-paddy farming and/or from working as paid labourers. 
After six years, due to shading, no annual crops can be grown in the ladang. In this case anak 
ladangs may, subject to owner's approval, harvest some of cinnamon trees to allow enough space 
to grow annual crops. However, the owner usually opts not to harvest a 6-year old plantation 
because it produces bark of low quality. If such is the case, anak ladangs need to have another 
contract to operate another ladang. As for the land owner, he or she receives no income before 
cinnamon is harvested. Stages in the establishment of a ladang are illustrated by Figures 1a-1d. 
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Figure 1a A new ladang at the forest frontier, with damaged forests shown in the 
background.  The farmer is a new, young, anak ladang of 18 years of age.  
Photographer: D.H. Wibowo. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1b: Regrowth during the drying period.  Photographer: D.H. Wibowo 
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Figure 1c: A ladang after 5 years of plantation, with potato and cinnamon as the main crops. 
 The ladang is on sloping land.  Photographer: D.H. Wibowo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1d: A ladang after cinnamon trees reach an age of 12 years or more.  This could be 
called a monospice agroforest, with a negligible number of banana and cassava 
planted on the edge.  Photographer: D.H. Wibowo. 
 
The Modes of Capital Accumulation 
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We observe three different modes of capital accumulation in the villages surveyed. The first two 
relate to the accumulation of land capital by successful anak ladangs and land owners, while the 
third to the accumulation of capital in the form of cinnamon plantations. To illustrate the first 
two modes, land ownership history of individuals A and B is presented. Land owner A is an 
induk semang and a potato trader. He began clearing an area of 2 hectares in 1971, but then 
gradually added another 11 hectares over a period of 21 years (1971-1992). Initially he financed 
his forest clearing from a financial surplus generated from his trading activity, but in the 1980s 
and 1990s his cinnamon plantation provided adequate surplus to clear other forests. Land owner 
B has a different history of forest clearing. He began as an anak ladang in mid 1970s and had 
since accumulated adequate capital from a cinnamon plantation to clear a three-hectare forest in 
1986. He cleared another 5 hectares between 1990 to 1993. Both farmers A and B never 
purchased a ladang.   
 
These stories indicate that forest clearing and the subsequent agriculture, i.e. cinnamon and 
potato farming, have the capacity to generate capital to finance for further forest clearing. This is 
the first mode of capital accumulation. Using this mode an anak ladang is able to move to a 
higher social status, that is, to become a land owner.  
 
The second mode of capital accumulation is by the use of financial surpluses generated from 
other sectors, e.g. the trading sector. There are a number of reasons for this. First, the social 
values held in the region result in greater land ownership giving a higher social status. This 
motivates farmers to increase their land ownership. Secondly, farmers are attracted by the high 
financial returns obtained from forest clearing and the subsequent agriculture (See Table 2 for 
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details). Such high returns are in stark contrast to the limited availability of other financially 
attractive investments at the village level. Thirdly, farmers feel more of ease with the technical 
details of forest clearing and the subsequent agriculture than those of other investments. 
 
By clearing a forest, farmers acquire a parcel of land which enables them to invest their time and 
cash-capital in cinnamon plantation. It takes 4 years before the investment starts producing a 
financial return, but farmers normally opt not to harvest the plantation for at least another 8 
years. Thus, cinnamon serves as a "long-term maturity bond" which will be liquidated after 12 
years. The choice of liquidation (or harvesting) timing depends not only on the prevailing prices 
of cinnamon bark and the age of the plantation, but also on whether or not the farmer is in need 
of immediate cash for large expenses. The most cited reasons for liquidation are for expenses of 
land purchase, children's education (e.g. college entry costs), pilgrimage to Mecca and the 
building of a house. 
 
Who Makes the Decision to Clear a Forest? 
 
Our study indicates that instead of being a cause of deforestation, poverty (or more precisely lack 
of adequate capital) precludes poor farmers from clearing a forest. Young and poor anak ladangs 
have in fact very limited role in the decision making that leads to forest clearing. The reason is 
that, first, unless they have adequate family labourers to clear a forest, anak ladangs cannot 
afford the minimum capital required for forest clearing. To clear a hectare of forest costs about 
Rp 300 000, while the subsequent land clearing adds another Rp 450 000 (14). These costs are 
far beyond the financial capacity of an anak ladang. Secondly, even if they have adequate capital 
to finance forest clearing (15), anak ladangs cannot gain adequate cash to support themselves 
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during the period between forest clearing and annual crop harvests, termed as the idle-period, 
which normally takes more than a year.  
 
For these reasons, the decision to clear a forest rests mostly with induk semangs, land owners and 
more established (and older) anak ladangs. They are most likely to have adequate capital to 
finance forest clearing and to support themselves during the idle-period. As Table 1 shows, while 
all land owners and induk semangs had in the past cleared a forest, only a tiny 3% of anak 
ladang (1 respondent) did so (16). The fact that 83% of farmers in the anak ladang/land owner 
group had in the past cleared a forest indicates that while as a young farmer an anak ladang is 
precluded from deforestation, in the later years, after accumulating adequate capital he or she is 
likely to clear forest land.     
 
Financial Returns from Deforestation 
 
Table 2 presents estimated returns from forest clearing and the subsequent agriculture. Inputs, 
output and prices data used here are summarised in Appendix 1. Because the average length of 
the drying period is 9.6 months, while land clearing takes about 2 to 4 weeks, the land is not 
cultivated until 11 or 12 months after forest clearing is completed. For simplicity, we assume that 
the agriculture commences on the following year. Thus, if forest clearing occurs at year 0, potato 
farming and cinnamon plantation will begin at year 1 (17). 
In general, the results presented in Table 2 explain why farmers are able to accumulate adequate 
surplus to finance the next forest clearing. First let us look at the 2nd and 3rd columns of Table 2 
which show returns from a hectare of ladang if the distribution of income and costs between land 
owner and anak ladang is not taken into account. In financial terms, forest clearing and the 
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subsequent agriculture produce a high NPV of Rp 14.6 million hectare-1 (=US$ 6970 ha-1) over 
13 years. However, if land price is set at the prevailing market price of Rp 4.63 million ha-1 (US$ 
2205 ha-1) and family labourers are paid wages at the current wage rate, the NPV declines 
sharply to Rp 5.8 million ha-1 (US$ 2773 ha-1). This is the economic return of forest clearing and 
the subsequent agriculture. Despite such a decline, the economic IRR remains very high at 
47.4%. These figures indicate that forest clearing and the subsequent agriculture are capable of 
producing very high financial and economic returns for both land owner and the anak ladang. 
 
A clearer picture emerges if the financial returns to land owners and anak ladangs are computed 
separately. Without getting involved directly in cinnamon plantation, a land owner receives a 
financial return (IRR) of 24.5% or an NPV of Rp 846 191 ha-1 (US$ 403 ha-1). More importantly, 
the land owner receives a lump sum of Rp 9.2 million at year 12, which in today's value is equal 
to Rp 1.3 million. It means that 13 years after the first forest clearing, if the land owner wishes to 
add his/her land ownership, he or she will have sufficient cash to finance another forest clearing.  
 
As for anak ladang, the picture is more interesting. From year 1 to 5 the anak ladang obtains an 
annual net income of Rp 4.0 to 4.3 million ha-1. Because the average size of ladang operated by 
an anak ladang is 0.2 ha, this means the anak ladang receives a monthly net income of Rp 67 
488 to Rp 71 595 (US$ 32-34 month-1). By rural Indonesian standard, such a level of monthly 
income is adequate to support a family of 2-3 persons. It explains why anak ladangs can rely on 
potato farming to support themselves. More importantly, as does the land owner, the anak ladang 
receives a lump sum equivalent to Rp 1.3 million in today's value in year 12. It explains why 
older anak ladangs are able to gain adequate capital to finance future forest clearing, and thus, to 
become land owners. 
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One possible explanation why forest clearing and the subsequent agriculture produce such high 
returns is that forest lands are virtually an "open-access resource" and are significantly 
undervalued. Farmers are able to clear a forest and to claim ownership over the land underneath 
by investing Rp 750 000 ha-1 (US$ 357 ha-1), much less than the prevailing price of a ladang.  
Had forest lands been valued properly, forest clearing could have been made financially 
unattractive for farmers. For example, if land cost is set at Rp 1 731 582 ha-1 (US$ 825 ha-1) land 
owners would have received a zero financial NPV at a discounting rate of 16%. It would 
significantly reduce the incentive for deforestation because land owners are the major decision 
makers in this process. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
While in some cases deforestation can be associated with poverty, our study reveals the case 
where deforestation is caused by those with capital and the desire of wealthier members of the 
society to accumulate capital. Poverty is a deterrent to deforestation because poorer farmers have 
inadequate capital to finance forest clearing and to support themselves during the idle-period. 
The decision to clear a forest rests mostly with more established farmers such as land owners. 
 
Because forest lands are available at a fraction of their true economic worth, forest clearing and 
the subsequent agriculture are capable of producing high financial returns for farmers. In the 
early years, net income generated from these activities enables poorer farmers (i.e. anak ladang) 
to support themselves. In the later year, i.e. at the time of cinnamon harvest, a large cash capital 
is generated. This enables both poorer farmers and land owners to each finance the next round of 
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forest clearing. The social values held by the society, which result in greater land ownership 
giving a higher social status, motivate farmers to own a land and to increase their land 
ownership. In addition to financial surplus from the forestry and agricultural sectors, surpluses 
generated from other sectors, e.g. the trading sector, are also used to finance forest clearing. For 
farmers, forest clearing enables them to own a "long-term maturity bond" in the form of a 
cinnamon plantation. 
 
The policy implication of this study is straightforward. If deforestation is caused by capital 
accumulation behaviour of villagers, to ease the pressure on forest lands the government may 
need to, in addition to other measures, stimulate the creation of other financially attractive 
investments at the village level. This policy should be incorporated into a broader, and 
integrated, village development program to ensure economic and budgetary efficiencies. The 
government may also increase the financial costs and risks of illegal deforestation in order to 
make the activity less beneficial for farmers. Increased fees and/or fines for forest intruders may 
be considered provided that the government is not plagued by widespread corruption.  Revenues 
generated from these fees and fines may then be used to finance any programs designed to 
protect a national park, such as improved policing. 
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 Table 1. Proportion of farmers who in the past cleared a forest and the average size 
of forest cleared (... -1995) 
 
 
 
 
       Group of farmers a) 
 
  Proportion of 
  farmers that 
  cleared forest 
         b) 
 
 Average 
 size 
 of forest 
 cleared 
 (hectare)  
       c) 
 
 Average 
 size 
 of land 
 owned 
 (hectare)    
    d) 
 
 anak ladang (n1= 31, age= 23.4) 
 
          3 % 
 
    0.01 
 
     0.01 
 
 anak ladang/land owner (n2= 12, 
 age= 33.6) 
 
         83 % 
 
    1.27 
 
     3.38 
 
 Land Owner (n3= 5, age= 48.2) 
 
        100 % 
 
    5.93 
 
     7.96 
 
 Induk Semang (n4= 7, age= 45.4) 
 
        100 % 
 
    8.41 
 
    10.50 
 
Notes: a) Number of respondents = N = n1+n2+n3+n4= 55. The variable "age" represents 
the average age of the head of household in the group. 
b) It represents the number of respondents in each group who cleared a 
forest at least once during his/her life divided by the total number of 
respondents in each group. 
c) The average size of forest cleared by each group of farmers. 
d) Only includes ownership of ladangs (dry lands). 
 
 Table 2. Estimated returns from forest clearing and the subsequent  
agriculture (Rp hectare-1) 
 
 
 
 
 
          Total Net Returns 
 
     Financial Net Returns to 
 
Year 
 
Financial 
 
Economic 
 
Land Owner 
 
Anak Ladang 
 
0 
 
-750 000  
 
-4 630 000 
 
-750 000 
 
0  
 
1 
 
3 843 885  
 
2 643 231 
 
-205 400 
 
4 049 285  
 
2 
 
4 049 285  
 
2 107 978 
 
0 
 
4 049 285  
 
3 
 
4 049 285  
 
2 107 978 
 
0 
 
4 049 285  
 
4 
 
4 360 859  
 
2 403 552 
 
155 787 
 
4 205 072  
 
5 
 
4 542 160  
 
2 584 853 
 
246 438 
 
4 295 722  
 
6 
 
2 817 085  
 
1 740 432 
 
396 221 
 
2 420 864  
 
7 
 
0  
 
-104 000 
 
0 
 
0  
 
8 
 
0  
 
-104 000 
 
0 
 
0  
 
9 
 
0  
 
-104 000 
 
0 
 
0  
 
10 
 
0  
 
-104 000 
 
0 
 
0  
 
11 
 
0  
 
-104 000 
 
0 
 
0  
 
12 
 
18 314 458  
 
18 150 458 
 
9 157 229 
 
9 157 229  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 NPV 
 at 16% 
 
 
14 637 740  
 
 
5 824 234 
 
 
846 191 
 
 
13 791 549  
 
 IRR 
 
n.a  
 
47.4% 
 
24.5% 
 
n.a  
 
Note: n.a = not applicable 
 
 Appendix 1. Inputs, output and prices data 
 
A. Potato Farming (season-1 hectare-1)  C. Prices and Wages 
 
Seeds (kgs)   874   Potato seed (Rp kg-1) 670 
Fertilisers (kgs)     Cinnamon seedling 
   Urea (nitrogen)  257      (Rp plant-1)  100 
   Phosphate   514   Urea (Rp kg-1)  290 
Mix of pesticides and insecticides   Phosphate (Rp kg-1)  450 
   (unit)  57   Mix of pesticides and 
Number of delivery times for:      insecticides (Rp unit-1) 17 000 
   Fertilisers   15   Delivery costs 
   Output (potato)  129      (Rp delivery-1) 
Family labourers used       Fertilisers   2250 
   (days)   221      Output (potato)  5000 
Hired labourers (days) 62   Wages (Rp day-1)  4000 
Output (kgs)      Potato prices 2) 
   Large size   7540      Large size (Rp kg-1) 546 
   Medium size 1594      Medium size (Rp kg-1) 375 
   Small size   468      Small size (Rp kg-1) 188 
Price of cinnamon bark 
B. Cinnamon Plantation 1)       (Rp kg wet bark-1)  1200 
Land acquisition costs 
Number of initial plants 1956      Forest clearing (Rp ha-1) 300 000 
Survival rate         Land clearing (Rp ha-1) 450 000 
   Year 1   89%   Market price of a ladang 
   Year 2   94%      (Rp ha-1)   4 630 000 
   Year 3   96% 
   Year 4-12   100%   Exchange rate US$ 1.00 = Rp 2100 
Replanting (number of plants)    
   Year 1   98 
Thinning (number of plants) 
   Year 4   249 
   Year 5   249 
   Year 6   332 
Harvest (number of plants) 
   Year 12   830 
Family labourers used  
   (days)   26-79 
Hired labourers (days) 0 
Output (kgs plant-1) 
   Year 4 (wet bark)  1.07 
   Year 5 (wet bark)  1.65 
   Year 6 (wet bark)  1.99 
   Year 12 (wet bark) 18.40 
 
Notes: 1) No fertilisers, insecticides and pesticides are used in cinnamon plantation 
2) Weighted average of prices over the period of October 1994 - July 1995 with 
 each farmer's sales volume used as the weighing factor. 
